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Abstract—Virtualization, after having found
widespread adoption in the server and desktop
arena, is poised to change the architecture of embedded
systems as well. The benefits afforded by virtualization
— enhanced isolation, manageability, flexibility, and
security — could be instrumental for developers of
embedded systems as an answer to the rampant increase
in complexity.
While mature desktop and server solutions exist, they
cannot be easily reused on embedded systems because
of markedly different requirements. Unfortunately, op-
timizations aimed at throughput, important for servers,
often compromise on aspects like predictable real-time
behavior, which are crucial to many embedded systems.
In a similar vein, the requirements for small trusted
computing bases, lightweight inter-VM communication,
and small footprints are often not accommodated. This
observation suggests that virtual machines for embed-
ded systems should be constructed from scratch with
particular attention paid to the specific requirements.
In this paper, we set out with a virtual machine
designed for security-conscious workloads and describe
the steps necessary to achieve good event-handling
latencies. That evolution is possible because the un-
derlying microkernel is well suited to satisfy real-time
requirements. As the guest system we chose Linux
with the PREEMPT_RT configuration, which itself was
developed in an effort to bring down event-handling
latencies in a general purpose system. Our results
indicate that the increase of event-handling latencies of
a guest running in a virtual machine does not, compared
to native execution, exceed a factor of two.
Keywords-Virtualization; Operating System; Real-time
Computing; Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, innovations first took place in the desk-
top and server market before they trickled down to
embedded systems some years later. Although the gap
in capabilities is likely to persist, high-end embedded
devices more and more resemble desktop systems in
term of hardware (compute power, memory sizes)
and software (general purpose operating systems, open
system architecture). Assuming that this follow-suit
trend is to continue, it should not be too long before
virtualization gains traction in embedded devices. Be-
fore dwelling on real-time characteristics, we would
like to briefly recite the arguments for virtualization in
embedded devices.
A. The Case for Virtualization in Embedded Systems
Development support. Tight time-to-market times
can only be achieved though pervasive software reuse.
Despite all efforts, dependencies between software
components are often intricate, requiring substantial
development effort when changes are needed. More-
over, quite a few applications hinge on particular
operating systems, or even specific versions of them.
Virtualization obviates the need to settle for one op-
erating system, but instead allows to run multiple of
them in parallel. The easy reuse of tried-and-tested
components will cut down on the development effort
thereby reducing costs and shortening the time-to-
market.
Platform migration. In the past, more powerful
devices automatically translated into better function-
ality. The recent tendency to multicore processors
makes that benefit increasingly harder to reap as only
multithreaded software benefits from the presence of
additional cores. Virtualization opens up the opportu-
nity to eschew the daunting task of porting single-core
software stacks, instead reusing it outright. Generally,
the introduction of virtualization into the system stack
requires only the hypervisor to be ported to new
devices; the higher layers need only small adoptions
or none at all.
Security. Traditionally, security from non-physical
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attacks was not a major concern for embedded systems.
Even if a device contained defects, these were difficult
to exploit as the usual attack vector — network
connectivity — was unheard-of. That has changed
profoundly in the recent past. High-end embedded
systems more and more resemble desktop systems
regarding computing capabilities, usage scenarios, and
connectivity. The applications they accommodate share
many traits with those found on desktops, security
vulnerabilities included. Security-wise, the calm past
has given way to a frantic struggle between attackers
raking about for exploitable deficiencies and defenders
hurrying for closing them promptly. While security
threats against desktops are severe, they hold the po-
tential to be devastating for embedded systems. Unlike
the stationary cousins, embedded systems often are
restricted in their means to repulse malware. Installing
an new version of an anti-virus solution is just not on
the table. Given the gravity of the situation and the
inevitability of its occurence, it is urgent to tighten
the defences. Virtualization may provide the isolation
needed to contain an attacker, thus offering deeper
defense. The feasibility of this approach has been
borne out by contemporary gaming consoles, where
hypervisor-based security architectures have proven
sufficiently capable of denying ultimate control to
flocks of highly motivated attackers.
Consolidation. Today it is not uncommon to phys-
ically separate subsystems to ensure non-interference.
The downside is that the number of control units grows
which raises concerns as to the bill of material, weight
of wiring, and reliability in the face of numerous
physical connections, which are vulnerable to aging.
License separation. Platform vendors are often con-
cerned about their system architecture not to be re-
vealed to competitors. For that reason, they do not like
the publication of, say, device drivers as these may
give hints at the underlying hardware. This attitude is
at odds with some important open source operating
systems, which require source code access for device
drivers. The tension can be eased if software with
intellectual property rights restrictions is placed in a
VM where it is not subject to licenses requiring source
access.
Partial Validation. If the interaction between compo-
nents cannot be characterized precisely, then a tightly
integrated system has to be revalidated as a whole
whenever any single component is changed. Con-
versely, as long as component interaction is limited
to well-defined interfaces (including temporal aspects),
it is sufficient to check whether a component adheres
to the interface specification. Changes of a component
then would not require a system validation.
Remote Management. The growing device complex-
ity makes it ever more likely that some unexpected
situation arises after the device is shipped. Therefor
it would be desirable to remotely assess the situation
and take remedial measures. It the best case, the issue
is fixed by a remotely initiated update before the user
even notices that something was about to break. For
all its virtues, remote management cuts both ways. If
not properly secured, a remote management interface
is a downright invitation for attackers to take over
the device. As such, it must be ensured that only
properly authorized requests are honored. There should
be a secure anchor in the platform, which cannot be
even disabled if an attacker has already succeeded in
penetrating some parts of the system.
B. Challenges for Embedded Virtualization
Embedded devices differ from their desktop and
server cousins in that they are often charged with
tasks that require interacting with their environment
in real-time. The transition from special-purpose real-
time operating systems to general purpose operating
systems like Linux poses enough problems in itself
in that respect. Virtualization requires modifications
deep in the software stack. In order to hurt real-
time performance not too much the following three
problems have to be taken into account.
First, virtualization support in current processors
comes in the shape of additional processor privilege
levels1. Not only have incoming event now to traverse
more modes (CPUs deliver events normally to the most
privileged mode), the state transitions also take longer
due to the huger state involved. With current hardware,
these additional expensive transitions in timing-critical
paths are inevitable and will lead to increases in event-
handling latencies.
Second, the relative cost of individual operation
changes, which requires a redesign of timing critical
paths. For example, on a non-virtualized platform
1The details differ though. Some instruction set architectures
added to their existing privileges less privileged modes (x86 guest
mode (AMD) and non-root mode (Intel)) while other went for more
privileged modes (PPC hypervisor mode).
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arming a timer takes a trap into the operating system
kernel and a device access. In a virtual machine, a guest
is not allowed to access the physical timer directly
because of contention from other guests. Attempts to
access the device trap into the hypervisor, which takes
care of multiplexing the physical timer. Unfortunately,
this costly operation is in critical event handling paths.
An alternative is to let the hypervisor arm the timer
speculatively when it injects an event. The guest OS
can then resume the event handler process without the
delay incurred during setting the (virtual) timer.
Lastly, the hypervisor has to be aware of the internal
operations of a VM. Assume a process in a VM
that runs with the highest priority and shall complete
execution as fast as possible. Further assume that,
during the execution of that process, an IRQ arrives.
The hypervisor takes over control and dispatches the
event to the virtual machine monitor2, which in turn
injects it into the VM. Only then the decision is
taken that the event does not bear on the scheduling
configuration and the high priority task is resumed. At
that point an appreciable amount of time has elapsed
due to the privilege changes and context switches .
Had the hypervisor or the VMM had the information
that the IRQ does not affect the current scheduling
decision in the VM, either one could have abstained
from forwarding the event and instead directly resumed
the interrupted activity. This short-circuiting, though,
is only possible if it is known that a high priority
process is executing. Otherwise, forwarding the event
is the correct action. As the architecturally defined VM
interface does not convey this kind of information,
additional interfaces are needed to bridge the semantic
gaps that opens up between hypervisor, VMM, and
guest VM.
C. Goal and Outline
Our goal was to build a system with the following
properties:
1) The trusted computing base — the set of all
hardware, firmware, and software components
that are critical security and safety of a system —
shall be small. It is well accepted that a reduction
in complexity is instrumental in building reliable
systems.
2We assume that the VMM runs as a user-level task.
2) Given the scarcity of native applications for
security-conscious environments, the reuse of
legacy software shall be easily possible. As virtu-
alization is by definition compatible with a huge
body of software and exhibits good performance
characteristics, the system shall support multiple
virtual machines.
3) One of this virtual machines shall be able to
pick up promptly on incoming events. The hosted
guest shall see event-handling latencies that are
within a reasonable range of that seen on physi-
cal hardware.
The contribution of this paper is twofold: first, we
present a software stack that takes into account both
real-time and security requirements. We assess the
impact of this arrangement on real-time workloads
running in a VM.
In the second part, we investigate how real-time
behavior can be improved if the guest provides hints
regarding its real-time operations. Although such hints
require guest modifications, we found that these mod-
ifications can be kept to a minimum and improve
significantly on the real-time performance.
II. BACKGROUND
Requirements regarding security, fault-tolerance, and
real-time performance can only be met if the lowest
layer in the software stack, the operating system kernel,
provides proper support. One long-standing quarrel
on this issue is whether monolithic kernels can be
adequately evolved or a shift towards microkernels
is the better choice. While a huge part of the OS
community recognizes the principal superiority of the
microkernel design, many point out that monolithic
kernels can catch up and retain their performance
advantage.
A. Microkernels
Operating system kernels are a critical component
in the software stack. Kernels find themselves in
the situation that they have to guarantee safety and
security for all applications running on top of them,
yet cater to specific needs of single applications.
Applications often have very specific requirements,
which are not easily conveyed through the syscall
interface. An operating system would like to hand over
the resource management to applications as that would
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allow to apply arbitrary policies without adversely
affecting non-participating parties.
A microkernel is an operating system kernel that
contains only those mechanisms needed to imple-
ment a complete operating system on top. Typically
these mechanisms include address space management,
scheduling, and message passing. Other functionality
such as device drivers, protocol stacks, and file systems
is provided by user-level servers. The upside of this
approach is that resources can be selectively allocated
to user-level tasks, which then can manage them at
their discretion.
While hailed as the future of operating systems,
microkernels have not supplanted monolithic kernels
across the board. Although many experimental mi-
crokernels demonstrated the potential benefits, neither
one saw enough take-up, which would have been
necessary for a self-sustaining software ecosystem.
Furthermore, systems built on monolithic kernels kept
their performance edge and had some of their defi-
ciences alleviated. For example, the often raised point
of lacking flexibility was answered by the introduction
of kernel modules. The lack of success on desktops and
servers notwithstanding, microkernels made their way
into systems that care about security and scheduling.
Scheduling: When a computation involving up-
dates of multiple variables can be preempted, further
synchronization mechanisms have to be employed to
ensure consistency. While lockless schemes such as
RCU[1] and lock-free synchronization[2] have an edge
over classical lock-based synchronization in certain
cases, the latter is easier to understand and thus
prevalent.
Retrofitting preemptibility into monolithic kernels
by adding locks to data structures is tedious because
assumptions as to atomic execution are usually deeply
entrenched and non-obvious. Deadlock situations may
arise if the lock grabbing sequence does not rule out
circular dependencies. If the objects to be protected
come into being and perish at a high rate, coming up
with a suitable lock ordering is far from trivial. The
situation is aggravated if long running operations shed
held locks intermittently and reacquire them before
resuming. Such a courtesy may be imperative, though,
if operations with tighter timing requirements require
prompt access. Furthermore, for most real systems,
event-handling latencies are not an overriding priority
and thus must not hurt throughput performance too
much. As a consequence, the number of locks in
often-used code paths has to be limited, which may
result in longer lock-protected paths. The problem
was encountered by developers of the PREEMPT RT
flavor of the Linux kernel. Up to 15% performance
degradation[3] was enough to stir opposition against
mainline inclusion.
Given the difficulties of directly improving on the
preemptibility of an existing kernel, it may be expedi-
ent to absolve it from scheduling and assign that task
to a real-time scheduler. For that purpose, a shim is
interposed between the old kernel and the hardware,
taking over the primary responsiblity for scheduling.
The old kernel is - from a scheduling point of view -
relegated to a real-time tasks. As such, it can stop the
flow of events from the shim to it. However, it cannot
prevent events arriving at the shim and triggering
scheduling decisions there.
The idea has gained some momentum, both in open
source and commercial project. One of the first projects
along this architecture was RTLinux[4]. RTAI[5] and
its successor, the Xenomai project followed suit. The
downside of this approach is that the shim only takes
over scheduling but does not assume control over
memory management. Memory management still lies
with the host kernel, in these cases Linux. Real-time
tasks are loaded into the Linux kernel and become
subject to the real-time scheduling after initialization.
The common residency in kernel space means that
crashes are not contained in address spaces. Xenomai
tries to mitigate the issue by optionally placing real-
time applications in address spaces. While faults of
other real-time tasks become survivable, crashes in the
Linux kernel are still fatal.
The next step is not only to confer scheduling to the
shim but also hand the responsibility for memory man-
agement completely over to it. That would strengthen
the surviveability of the system as more parts are
subject to address space isolation. The downside is
that this encapsulation carries the cost of privilege
level transitions in critical paths. Nonetheless, many
system have adopted that architecture, among them
QNX Neutrino[6], PikeOS[7], and L4 [8].
Security: Monolithic kernels have grown to a
complexity were it becomes intractable to reason about
all possible interactions in the kernel. Given that each
defect may be used to gain control over the kernel, such
a situation is a security nightmare. In contrast, small
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kernels are more amenable to thorough examination,
which instills confidence regarding their correctness.
This scrutiny can be even taken as far as to have them
undergo formal verification[9].
A prerequisite for a small trusted computing base,
a small kernel alone is not sufficient, though. Rather
it is necessary that privileged user level servers cannot
be tricked into exercising their authority on behalf of
a malevolent party. This issue — widely known as
confused deputy problem — can be ascribed to the
separation of naming and privilege.
Capabilities facilitate the construction of system that
honour the pinciple of least authority. Despite their
undenied advantages, capabilities have not found their
way into mainstream operating systems. The reason for
that might well be that capabilities are not compatible
and thus cannot retrofitted into the APIs of mainstream
OSs. A recent effort by Watson at al[10] shows promise
to make deeper inroads but is yet in early stages.
Researchers, who have not to take legacy APIs into
consideration, were more successful with creating con-
ceptually clean systems. The first system that featured
a small kernel and capability-based access control,
EROS[11], was followed by more systems with these
traits[12][13].
B. Virtualization
Microkernel-based systems are relatively novel un-
der active development and as such still in a state of
flux. An steadily changing kernel interface, though, is
a difficult target for user-level components. Although
native system frameworks have come into existence,
they cannot rival existing operating system in features,
maturity, and application availability. To make up this
deficiency, system designers have chosen to reuse
whole operation systems with virtualization the most
promising technique.
A virtual machine is an software environment which
is capable of executing applications together with
their operating systems. A virtual machine imple-
ments the same instruction-set architecture as real
hardware, a guest cannot distinguish whether it runs
natively or under virtualization. While this requirement
can also be met by performance-sapping emulation,
virtual machines are required to exhibit near-native
performance. This requirement translates into the huge
majority of instructions being executed directly by
the host hardware. Complementing equivalence and
performance is control. The virtualization layer always
retains full control over the system. To that end the
part of the VM in control — the hypervisor —
interposes on operations that impinge upon system
resources such as memory or IO devices. Instead of
accessing the physical resource, the guest is provided
with virtual surrogates. As encapsulation is an explicit
virtualization goal, virtual machines naturally lend
themselves to serve as a unit of isolation.
The advantages of virtualization come at a cost,
though. Virtual machines operate in special processor
modes which incur substantial overhead when entered
or left. While also being a problem for systems aiming
at throughput, these world switching costs can add
substantially to the length of critical paths of real-time
applications if these were to run in VMs.
Apart from hardware-induced costs, software-related
costs have to be considered, too. Latencies incurred
by executing non-preemptible code paths within the
layers implementing the VM will add to those caused
by the OS kernel in the VM. For this reason, it is
not recommendable to use so-called hosted VMMs,
where an existing operating system is extended with
hypervisor functionaltiy. Bare-metal hypervisors can be
implemented as microkernels and as such have much
less code in timing-critical execution paths.
While bringing hardware and (direct) software costs
under control is necessary, it is not sufficient, though.
One severe problem with virtualization architectures
is that the machine interface does not propagate high-
level information, an issue also known as semantic gap.
For example, on bare hardware, there is no need for an
operating system to let the hardware know that there
is a highly prioritized real-time application runnable.
In contrast, under virtualization, a guest disabling
interrupts achieves only that no events arrive in its
VM. The system still accepts them and queues them
until they can be delivered. While the guest performs
correctly, it does not as fast as it could as interrupt
arrival entails costly world switches. If the lower layers
were aware that real-time tasks are active, they could
disable (at least) some events in order to expedite the
guest execution. The information that a real-time task
is active is not easily derived by the host, thus it has
to be signaled by the guest.
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III. DESIGN
We will start the description of our design by
covering the hypervisor and those features with a
bearing on real-time operations in VMs. Thereafter we
will elaborate on our virtual machine monitor. The
chapter is wrapped up with the explanation of the
changes we made to the guest.
Before we set out to detail our design, we will
take up an issue that often gives rise to confusion.
While often used interchangeably, the terms hypervisor
and virtual machine monitor signify two distinctively
different components in our architecture. More confus-
ingly, sometimes the hypervisor is used synonymously
with microkernel.
A hypervisor enforces isolation, that is it implements
protection domains, VMs being one flavor of them. For
doing so, it needs to exercise exclusive control over
data structures that control isolation such as page tables
and entry vectors. This is only possible if it runs in the
the most privileged CPU execution mode3 as only this
mode has full control over critical system resources
such as control registers.
A microkernel applies the principle of minimality
to the portion of software running in the most priv-
ileged execution mode. We understand microkernel
and hypervisor complementary. Hypervisor implies
a function whereas microkernel denotes a particular
design principle. As such, a microkernel can assume
the role of a hypervisor, or conversely, a hypervisor
can be implemented as microkernel.
A virtual machine monitor provides VMs with
functionality beyond CPU and memory virtualization,
which is the duty of the hypervisor. Typically, the
VMM supplies a VM with (virtual) devices and
coordinates its execution. Contrary to a hypervisor,
which always requires maximal CPU privileges, a
VMM can be either part of the kernel or implemented
as a user task.
A. Hypervisor
Our architecture builds on Fiasco.OC[12], a state-
of-the-art microkernel of L4 provenance. As typical
for microkernels, it only provides basic functionality
such as address space construction, and inter-process
3We only consider accessible execution modes, which leaves
out the system management mode, which is arguably even more
privileged.
communication (IPC), and scheduling. All the remain-
ing aspects such as device drivers and protocol stacks,
which are included in monolithic kernels, are relegated
into user level servers where they are subject to
address space containment. Under this arrangement, a
device driver failure, which is likely fatal in monolithic
systems, becomes survivable.
The original Unix security model, which served
as a role model for many contemporary systems,
does not allow for mandatory access control (MAC).
Each data owner may release data to arbitrary third
parties at his discretion without a system-wide imposed
security policy being able to prevent that. Efforts to
add mandatory access control mechanisms such as
SELinux have proven difficult and are widely deemed
inpractical. In contrast, Fiasco.OC features capability-
based access control[12], which highly expedient for
the construction of systems that follow the princple of
least authority.
Fiasco.OC can be used as an hypervisor[14][15]. In
line with the microkernel philosophy, it only provides
support for CPU and memory virtualization and leaves
the provisioning of virtual devices to a user-level vir-
tual machine monitor (VMM). It should be pointed out
that virtualization blends smoothly with the existing
system. Memory is provisioned into VMs the same
way as it is into non-VM protection domains. Access
to VMs is governed by the same capability mechanism
that controls access to any other object in the system.
Executing code in a VM is achieved through a thread
and as such under control of the Fiasco scheduler.
The object describing address spaces, the task, is
also used to provide the memory context for a VM. The
only modification is that the VM memory range covers
the full 4GB on 32bit architectures whereas tasks are
limited to 3GB. Each virtual machine has an associated
controller task, which controls its execution thereby
acting as a virtual machine monitor (VMM). Unlike
tasks, VMs cannot host threads directly. Instead, the
thread is bound to the controller task and migrates into
the VM when execution shall there resume. To that
end it invokes a microkernel syscall with a capability
to the VM object and a full architectural VM state as
arguments. This operation is reverted when an external
event arrives or a situation occurs that needs attention.
The last execution state of is then reported back.
From its inception, Fiasco was developed with real-
time support in mind. The kernel disables interrupts
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only for inavoidable atomic operations (e. g. thread
switching) and is thus highly preemptible. Scheduling
of threads is strictly based on static priorities.
Streamlined synchronous IPC was one of the defin-
ing characteristics of the original L4 and later de-
rived kernels. The reasoning was that communication
is mainly procedure-call-like and that asynchronous
event handling is so rare that kernel support is not
warranted. It turned out that the premise does not
hold for operating system kernels. Consequently, the
kernel’s threading model was augmented with a virtual
CPU mode [16], which proved very expedient for
OS rehosting. The underlying principle is that control
transfer between two tasks4 only takes place if there
are no pending interrupts. That mirrors the behavior
of physical machines, where transitioning from kernel
into user level is and allowing interrupt delivery is usu-
ally an atomic operation. Earlier designs lacking that
feature could ignore pending events for a whole time
slice, which is unacceptable for real-time operations.
For our work, the scope of this conditional operation
was extended to the switch into VM operation.
B. Virtual Machine Monitor
Instead of starting from scratch, we opted to improve
on the Karma VMM[15]. We identified parts of Karma
that might delay the delivery of events into the guest
and replaced them.
Our first modification concerned the timer handling.
Originally, Karma used Fiasco IPC timeouts as time
source. For historic reasons, Fiasco’s timer granularity
is rather coarse at 1000Hz. Clearly such a clock source
is inadequate to serve as a time source for a high-
resolution Linux timer. Since changing the Fiasco timer
infrastructure was beyond our scope, we decided to
offer a higher-resolution timer as an alternative. Our
choice was fell on the HPET. Ownership over the
device is given to one karma instance, whereby it
is allowed to program it directly and subscribe as
a recepient of its interrupts. Whenever the guest OS
tries to program its (virtual) timer, these accesses are
intercepted. The VMM retrieves the timeout to be set
from the guest’s execution state and arms the HPET
accordingly. When the time has elapsed, the HPET
raises an interrupt. Fiasco forwards it to the VMM,
4In L4Linux both the Linux kernel and Linux processes are
implemented as L4 tasks.
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Figure 1. Usual series of events upon arrival of a timer interrupt.
Steps 1-3: IRQ arrives and is injected into the VM. Steps 4-7: VM
reprograms timer chip for the next interrupt by issuing a hypercall.
Step 8: woken guest task is resumed.
which, in turn, injects it as a virtual interrupt into the
VM under its control.
Since the VMM is a regular task it does not
have direct device access. Instead it uses services
provided by infrastructure servers. In many cases,
service invocation involves sending messages (inter-
process communication, IPC). Unfortunately, most of
the currently used infrastructure employs synchronous
IPC to a certain degree.
However, a VMM does not fit well into this model.
A VM may accommodate multiple processes, each
of which can potentially initiate communication with
other servers (by accessing virtual devices). Since IPC
response times are not guaranteed to be short5, it could
happen that any activity in the VMM came to an halt
for a substantial period of time. Any incoming event
was delayed until an IPC reply arrived. To avoid these
delays we employ a dedicated thread for external IPC.
The main thread still detects the request from the guest,
but instead of sending the IPC itself it leaves that task
to the communication thread. The important point in
this construction is that the main thread gets not tied
up in an IPC and can promptly pick up on incoming
events.
IV. OPTIMIZATIONS
Our most important optimization concerned the de-
lay incurred by reprogramming the timer source. Usu-
ally Linux sets a new timeout promptly after the arrival
of a timer interrupt, i. e. directly in interrupt context
5In fact, most services do not specify any timing parameters.
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before resuming any (possibly real-time) process. The
sequence of events is shown in Figure 1. Since pro-
gramming the timer involves leaving and reentering
the VM and is thus a costly operation, the guest was
adapted to check whether the expired timer is about
to wake a real-time task and to postpone the timer
programming until after the task’s execution in these
cases. This allowed us to move the steps 4-7 off the
critical path. Once the real-time task has completed,
Karma is asked to set the next timeout. From the
guest’s perspective this behavior is correct because the
real-time load runs with the highest priority and cannot
be preempted by any other process. If the timeout has
not led to a wake-up of a real-time task, the timer
is programmed immediately as usual. Karma takes
provisions against run-away processes by setting an
emergency timeout that is far larger than the worst-case
execution time of the current job. Either a regular time
rearming or the completion notification of the real-time
task will let Karma cancel the emergency timeout.
Our second set of optimizations aimed at reducing
the overhead caused by lower-priority interrupts arriv-
ing during execution of a real-time task. As the initial
version of Karma injected interrupts into the VM in
a strict FIFO manner, the first improvement was to
sort the pending interrupts and deliver the one with
the highest priority first, thereby retaining hardware
semantics up to the VMM–VM interface, and holding
back the pending interrupts with lower priorities. Once
the VM reprograms the timer, Karma can be sure that
the real-time task has completed its time slice and
deliver the interrupts. For the next iteration we allowed
Karma to preclude the microkernel from delivering
low-priority events to the virtual machine altogether.
The occurrence of such events still causes a VM exit
and reentry in this scenario, but the additional context
switch to Karma is inhibited. Once the real-time task
has completed and the VM has announced to Karma
that event processing can resume, the microkernel
delivers the events to Karma which in turn injects them
into the guest. As a final step, we allowed Karma to
use the system’s hardware task priority register (TPR)
to directly inhibit the generation of hardware interrupts
below a chosen priority. This scenario finally also saves
the costly VM exits and reentries during the execution
of high-priority code by keeping interrupts pending
right on the interrupt controller.
V. EVALUATION
To evaluate the feasibility of our design, we ran
a number of experiments. Our test machine mounted
a AMD Phenom II X4 3.4GHz, 4GB RAM (DDR3,
1333MHz) on a Gigabyte GA-770TA-UD3 board, and
a Hitachi hard disk (500GB, 7200rpm, 16MB cache).
The virtual machines were provided with 256MB
RAM.
The guest running the realtime load was running
linux version 3.0.14-rt31 with the PREEMPT RT[17]
and Karma patches applied. In the guest VM, we
used cyclictest[18] (version 0.83), a utility waking
up periodically and measuring the deviation from
the expected wakeup time. These delays are a good
measure for the preemptibility of the operating system.
Our version of cyclictest is slightly modified in that it
reports the measured delay directly through a hyper-
call to Karma. Unless noted otherwise, the load was
generated in the same VM with “tar -xf linux.tar.bz2”
unpacking a disk-resident archive. For comparision, we
ran the same Linux configuration except for the Karma
patches on bare hardware. If not noted otherwise, all
measurements ran for one hour.
For our experiments, the guest running timesharing
loads was granted direct disk access, but had to use
the secure GUI as console. The GUI server has to
copy the framebuffer content of a client into the
device framebuffer. Without the decoupling described
in subsection III-B, it would not be possible to provide
the user with a responsive user interface and run real-
time tasks with tight deadlines at the same time.
Fiasco.OC offers a tracebuffer, which holds kernel
generated and user supplied logging messages. It can
be made visible as read-only region in the address
spaces of user-level tasks. We made extensive use of
this facility as time-stamped log messages were often
the only way to pinpoint causes of long delays.
A. Base Line Measurements
Our first measurement differs from the others in that
it is the only one not concerned with latencies. While
not the primary target, throughput is nonetheless of
interest. Figure 2 lists the times it takes to compile the
Linux kernel. The figures are only meant to gain an
understanding of relative performance, as the imposed
limitations (one CPU, 256MB memory) certainly hurt.
The result of approximately 3.5% slowdown is consis-
tent with earlier results[15].
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Compile time min max average
Native Linux 619.5s 620.4s 619.9s
Karma Linux 639.2s 641.0s 640.3s
Figure 2. Linux kernel compile benchmark, in seconds, smaller is
better. At least three runs were performed. All setups were limited
to one CPU and 256MB memory. In the case of Karma, disk
accesses were carried out directly without VMM intervention.
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Figure 3. Native Linux with RT PREEMPT patch latencies
measured with cyclictest (a) while cyclictest is the only load and
(b) while device interrupt inducing load is running. (The 0 bin
denotes latencies below 1µs.)
In our next measurement, we ran the guest in
the base configuration as shown in figures 3 and 4.
The important point to note is that the worst-case
latency under load increases less than twofold for the
virtualized case (14µs vs. 25µs).
B. Bridging the Semantic Gap
In this chapter we demonstrate how the real-time
performance can be improved if the actions of the guest
and the layers underneath it are better coordinated.
Figure 5 shows how the programming of the simulated
local APIC timer is rather expensive. By deferring the
timer reprogramming until the realtime workload has
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Figure 4. Baseline latencies measured with cyclictest in a guest
running on a Karma virtual machine (a) while cyclictest is the only
load and (b) while device interrupt inducing load is running in the
same guest.
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Figure 5. (a) Baseline latencies measured with cyclictest. (b)
Latencies with deferred timer programming.
finished, we can improve the release latency of the
realtime workload dramatically.
There are however situations which can not be
improved by postponing the reprogramming. Usually
Linux refrains from programming the timer if the
required delay is so small that it can not be reliably
programmed; but it does not take the expensive round-
trip to the VMM into account. Thus if Linux calls out
to the VMM in order to reprogram the timer for a
delay that is above its own programming threshold but
less than the actual time required to exit and reenter
the VM, Karma will refuse to program the device and
directly inject a synthetic timer event into the VM. This
saves the additional delay of programming the timer
chip, but the costs incurred by leaving and reentering
the VM cannot be remedied. The latencies experienced
during such a series of events (termed a ”soft trigger”
as opposed to a ”hard trigger”, which means an actual
hardware timer interrupt) are shown in Figure 6. In
the future, we will try to reliably detect close timeouts
in Linux. In such situation it might be better to poll
instead of calling the hypervisor.
Upon an HPET interrupt, Fiasco raises the TPR6
value such that only its own timer interrupts for
scheduling can pass. If the HPET interrupt results
in the release of an event handler, then it can run
without interference from device interrupts. After the
handler has signaled the VMM its completion, the
latter unmasks the HPET. Fiasco also detects this and
lowers the TPR to the regular level. Figure 7 shows the
the effect of that procedure. The worst case latencies
grow by 6µs if the TPR optimization is disabled.
6The task priority register allows to specify a threshold for
interrupt delivery. Interrupt vectors with a numerically smaller
value are not delivered.
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Figure 6. Latency comparison of interrupts delivered directly
from the hardware (”hard trigger”) against interrupts synthesized
by Karma when the desired wakeup time has already been reached
(”soft trigger”). The figure on top shows the latencies on an
otherwise idle system, the bottom one on a system with a device
interrupt inducing load. Delayed timer programming is active in
both setups.
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Figure 7. Latencies measured inside the virtual mashine with (b)
and without (a) optimizations in place.
C. Isolation at VM Level
In our final measurement we investigated whether
load running in a separate VM has an impact on the
real-time latencies. To that end, we ran our workload
in a second VM with a Linux 2.6.35.2 and Karma
patches applied. Figure 8 shows the meaurement results
alongside measurements with load running in the real-
time VM. We put the higher latencies down to heavier
pressure on caches and TLBs.
VI. RELATED WORK
Linux has been used in quite a few projects
to serve as the general purpose part in a hybrid
system[4][19][5]. Limited to scheduling, the real-time
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Figure 8. Overall latencies measured by cyclictest (a) where
load is induced in the same guest as the real-time workload and
(b) where load is induced in a second virtual machine on the same
physical machine.
layer has to rely on the Linux kernel for services like
program loading or memory access. To circumvent
the intricate user-level management of Linux, which
involves paging, real-time tasks are often implemented
as kernel modules. Kernel memory is not paged
under Linux, the real-time executive can be sure that
a once-loaded task is resident. Since all real-time
applications run in the same kernel address space,
faults cannot be contained with address spaces.
Although recent versions of Xenomai offer user-level
real-time applications, they still limit them to a
specific API. Maintaining more than the Linux API is
seen as too cumbersome by many developers, though.
Regardless of whether user tasks are encapsulated,
the Linux kernel runs in kernel space in any case.
Its immense size makes the presence of defects,
especially in device drivers, highly likely.
Kiszka[20] evaluates the use of Linux as a real-time
hypervisor. Using KVM and Linux-RT as a host and
a guest system latencies are evaluated. A paravirtu-
alized scheduling interface is introduced to improve
the scheduling in the guest. The evaluations show that
reasonable scheduling latencies can be achieved.
Rehosting an operating system on top of a micro-
kernel has been investigated before [21][22][23]. The
approach reflects the lacking hardware virtualization
support at the time. On architectures without tagged
TLBs, performance is noticably degraded because of
the context switch now necessary for a (guest) kernel
entry. Still, it is possible to achieve reasonable guest
event-handling latencies with such approaches[24].
Bruns at al[25] evaluated the application of a micro-
kernel based system for real-time. A rehosted RTOS
was run on a commercially available embedded plat-
form and compared to its native version. The evaluation
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showed that the benefits of consolidation outweighed
the performance impact of the virtualization approach.
EROS[11] demonstrated that a capability system can
be built on a small kernel and yield message passing
performance on a par with other then state-of-the-art
microkernels. Unlike other systems that expose disk
space through a file system, EROS went for a persistent
model. That state of the system resides primarily on
disk and is only fetched into memory for execution.
This classical example for caching entails making
decisions which objects are kept in memory and which
are written back to disk. EROS did not provide any
mechanisms to influence this caching, giving real-time
applications no chance to ensure they stay memory-
resident.
Mesovirtualization, proposed by Ito and Oikawa
in [26], is a virtualization approach targeted at the
x86 architecture that minimally changes the guest
operating system. As a guest they apply Linux on
their VMM implementation Gandalf, and show a better
performance when comparing with Linux on Xen,
attributing their advance to their annotations.
In [27] Ito and Oikawa have implemented and
evaluated shadow page-table implementations in the
Gandalf VMM. They achieve better results than Xen,
however they modify the page handling code of their
Linux guest.
Kinebuchi et al. [28] propose task grain scheduling
to host a Linux and an RTOS on an L4 based hyper-
visor on embedded systems. The guests are adapted to
run in this environment and priorities of guest tasks
are mapped to host ones. Their evaluation shows that
interrupt latency is increased significantly compared to
a native RTOS.
The current excitement for virtualization obscures
the fact that the layers need to implement virtual
machines may grow the attack surface, rendering the
system as whole even more vulnerable. Peter at al[29]
have shown that kernel support can be added to
microkernels with minimal effort without undermining
the security properties of the system. This work did
not seek to minimize the trusted computing base for
the VM itself, though, which was demonstrated later
[13]. Liebergeld at al[15] further demonstrated that vir-
tualization does not hurt the real-time performance of
application running alongside the VM. The feasibility
of the VM to support real-time applications inside was
not investigated.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an architecture
that allows for the execution of real-time tasks in
a virtual machine. Our results indicate that real-time
performance comparable to loads run on bare hardware
is only possible if the guest can give hints at its current
execution status to lower layers of the software stack.
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